Author: Hacer Zekiye Gönül
19 September 2024
Muslims across the globe have reacted with horror and protest to the war in Gaza. China’s Muslims and their reactions, however, have been less in the spotlight.
Take the case of Hui, the largest Muslim minority group in China who are culturally integrated with Han Chinese, using Mandarin as their primary language, yet remaining distinct through their religious practices. Their identity is primarily defined by Islam, and they have a history that spans centuries, blending Islamic and Chinese cultural elements, such as architecture and religious practices. Unlike Uyghurs, Hui people were historically seldom victims of anti-Muslim sentiment or severe state persecution in China. More recently, the Xi Jinping administration ushered in and accelerated a series of changes in how the Party-State defines “normal and lawful Islam” in ways that threatens to bring Hui cultural and religious practices within the Party-State’s definition of “dangerous,” “extremist” and “illegal” activity.
While Hui Muslims in modern China have often been framed as a “model” minority vis-à-vis their Uyghur counterparts, they have more recently been increasingly drawn into the adverse effects of the Chinese government’s securitization of Islam, which now renders them more Muslim and less Chinese in China’s public imaginary. As a result, many Hui Muslims at home and outside of China were forced to become more selective about publicly expressing their religious identity. They know well that the depiction of a “model” minority in the Chinese context does not mean that the depicted minority has a secure position in society or in the eyes of the Party-State. The privilege that comes with being a “model” minority is ambiguous and, at best, conditional.
We see this conditional favouritism at work in the Hui-dominated and government-authorised Islamic Association of China (IAC), which helped portray Hui people as China’s ambassadors to the Islamic world, both as part of the Belt and Road initiative and previously during the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The IAC and its Muslim representatives were tasked with convincing Muslim-majority countries that Communist China with a sizeable Muslim population is a friend to all Muslims in the world, that it “understands more about the problems and needs of these developing nations”[1] and “detests the [Israeli–Palestine] war”[2] since early 1990s.
Solidarity with Palestine among Hui people is not solely a recent phenomenon. Going back as far as 1994, the Hui-dominated IAC expressed outrage, allegedly on behalf of Chinese Muslims, at the ongoing “massacre of innocent Palestinian brothers” by Israel around the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre also known as the Hebron massacre, where 25 February 1994, which was also the 15th day of Ramadan, American Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein, a Zionist extremist from the far-right Kach movement murdered 29 Palestinians at Hebron Mosque. The IAC, which toes the government line, called on the international community and “the relevant authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the lives and property of the Palestinian people and to ensure that such incidents do not recur”[3]. In stark contrast to the IAC’s government-backed concerns about human rights abuses in Iraq [4] and Palestine, Xi Jinping declared in 2017 that – as regards the mass internment of Uyghurs in camps in Xinjiang – “no country should interfere in other countries’ internal problems”[5].
Party-State endorsement
The Party-State is willing to nonetheless speak out (or permit speech) about the Palestinian cause, as demonstrated by a recent call from Xi Jinping for a peace conference to end “tremendous suffering” [6] in Gaza. Statements such as this, as well as Arab leaders’ visits to Beijing, continue to give Hui Muslims a sense of licence to support their fellow Muslims in the Gaza conflict. Members of the Hui diaspora have been particularly vocal in campaigning on Gaza, attending protests for Palestine, and disseminating information through social media and messaging apps such as WhatsApp and WeChat. Some Hui families joined Europe’s various marches for Palestine with their children and encouraged each other to attend, waving Palestinian flags and chanting to demand the end of the bombings. Moreover, some of the Hui shared the call for a boycott of Israeli products.
On social media, a Hui attendee of the London national march for Palestine shared “we are here now and so many non-Muslims are here [as well]”. The responses to this comment continue with “this is about humanity”. Another Hui attendee commented on police repression of a pro-Palestinian march in Paris by stating that “similar marches of Jewish are tolerated [not disrupted]” with an angry emoji attached to the comment. These types of remarks may seek to establish a narrative of shared experience of increased Islamophobia both in mainland China and outside.
Some Hui commentators stated their satisfaction about China’s position as a constructive player in the Middle East and the broader global south – a development that filled them with pride, as Muslims from China. Furthermore, a few Hui Muslims who have lived abroad over five years stated that they are happy to see Xi Jinping’s promise “to speak up and uphold justice for Palestine [7] by showing the news about the talk at the Great Hall of the People with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas who is on a state visit to China. Another Hui also added the fact that China was one of the first countries to recognize the Palestinian Authority [8] and has repeatedly backed the Palestinians in votes at the UN [9]. This pro-CCP messaging suggests that some Hui people seek to reconcile their multifaceted cultural identity, expressing pride at being both Muslim and Chinese at once. Such expressions also fall within a historical pattern of Hui people acting as China’s voice on Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Perhaps even more interestingly, other Hui diaspora members have cautiously likened the current conflict between Palestinians and Jews to the Dungan Revolts of 1862–1877 [10] (also known as the Tongzhi Hui Revolts). The Dungan Revolts entailed an uprising by Hui and other Muslim ethnic groups, which took place along the banks of the Yellow River in the Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia provinces, as well as in Xinjiang (today’s XUAR/ET, then still known as Xiyu). The Dungan Revolt began with struggles between Han Chinese and the Hui Muslims about the feudal rule of the Qing Dynasty, mainly against ethnic discrimination and oppression [11], but subsequently spread to Xinjiang in a second wave during the Qing Dynasty period. The uprising was eventually suppressed by Qing forces with brutal force which is still politically sensitive from the Chinese government’s perspective. In one striking instance, a Hui social media user shared a documentary of the Dungan Revolts in response to a post concerning the fighting in Gaza, with the explanation that “this video shows that the history of one hundred and sixty years ago is happening once again”. Here, Hui support for Palestine may show religious solidarity against an overpowering oppressor (this time the imperial Qing government is likened to Israel), which highlights the fact that Hui continues to find avenues for expressing their religious identity, itself a central aspect of their cultural distinctiveness. However, most Hui commentators carefully avoid commenting on the catastrophic situation of Uyghurs in XUAR. We have clear evidence that many Hui are also concerned about the repression of Uyghurs, but they are seldom comfortable to express such opinions openly, beyond close gatherings of friends. By remaining much less vocal about the Uyghur crisis in public, Hui Muslims living outside China reveal an ongoing concern about the long arm of the CCP and the ever-tightening restrictions on their religious expression back home.
Restricted discourse in China
Domestically, the Chinese government restricted the online discussion on the Gaza issue after the family member of an Israeli diplomat was stabbed in Beijing [12]. On top of restriction of the online debate, a Hui who visited China recently shared that local governments in Hui-majority areas did not allow any discussion of the Palestinian-Israeli issue in the mosques [13]. Following the government controlling of the Palestine discussion of the Chinese social media, many Hui Muslims started sharing small documentary videos of the Zhang Chengzhi (1948-) who is one of the most influential and well-respected Hui Muslim writers and scholars in contemporary China [14]. He can speak many foreign languages including Arabic. In 2012, he donated US$100,000 to Palestinian refugees [15]. In September 2012, Zhang Chengzhi and his team set off from Beijing to Palestine, the trip lasted four days from the 12th to the 16th, and all US$100,000 was donated to Gaza Refugee Camp, a total of 476 families were assisted throughout the process. Some Hui Muslims refer to him as an imam and show their respect to him [16].
One of the most famous quotations from him to circle among the Hui netizens after the restrictions on Chinese social media:
[...] I’ll start with the process of printing a book, and then talk about the process of donating the proceeds from the book to Palestinian refugees. Please note: I am not talking about Palestine, the land owned by Palestinians, but about a place where Palestinians are driven from their homes and live as refugees after losing their homes… By Zhang Chengzhi [17].
Cautious depictions of his videos. Left: “Patriotism is not divided by nationality/ethnicity. No matter what you do, you represent us as Chinese. You are the pride in our hearts. I envy you so much. You have many languages. You are a real talent. You also have a great heart. Thumbs up for you”. Right: “Like it! The following sentences, such as ‘peace belongs to you…the resurrected Palestine...’ made me burst into tears.” (source: WeChat)
Other Hui netizens have begun sharing videos of interviews with Zhang Chengzhi and his poems that deal with Palestine and the Palestinian’s struggle has flooded China’s censored internet. Comments on these kinds of videos and quotes of him are mostly emojis that express “like”, “crying” and “thumbs-up” along with praises for his courage to raise the issue of Palestine’s struggle.
While domestic Hui have to be careful how they display transnational solidarity with their Muslim co-religionists, they have found all sorts of creative ways in the social media platforms, which play an increasingly prominent role in the CCP’s securitization campaign and public opinion struggle. For instance, they might use coded language or share content that appears innocuous but carries a deeper, hidden meaning. Hui go to great lengths to avoid the censors’ filters, coming up with new methods to discuss sensitive subjects regarding their religious identity. Indeed, Hui reactions compared to the rest of the Muslims across the globe are relatively small. However, the cautious positioning of the Hui suggests that their concern – unlike Uyghurs – is to protect their stand for the Party-State as distinctive enough to be viewed as a minority but not so visible as to disturb the CCP’s sense of political order even outside of China.
[1] China Muslim Journal, 1993, Issue (03),“Malaysian Delegation Visits China 马来西亚代表团访华”; China Muslim Journal, 1990, Issue (05),“Ambassadors of six Gulf countries called on the Islamic Association of China 海湾六国大使拜会中国伊协; China Muslim Journal, 2012, Issue (01),“从中国的外交政策看中国对阿拉伯国家的软实力优势 China’s Soft Power Superiority over Arab Nations--Seen from Its Diplomatic Policies； China Muslim Journal, 2009, Issue (06) South African Muslim Delegation Visits Islamic Association of China 南非穆斯林代表团访问中国伊协”; China Muslim Journal, 2007, Issue (03),“IAC Vice President Yang Zhibo Attended the Celebration of the Capital of Islamic Culture in Tripoli, Libya 中国伊协副会长杨志波出席利比亚的黎波里伊斯兰文化之都庆祝活动”.
[2] China Muslim Journal, 1994, Issue (03), The Islamic Society of China issued a statement strongly condemning the massacre of Palestinians, 中国伊斯兰教协会发表声明强烈谴责屠杀巴勒斯坦人的罪行.
[3] Ibid.
[4] China Muslim Journal, 2004, Issue (03), “In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate Statement of the Chinese Islamic Provincial Association on the Abuse of Prisoners by U.S. and British Coalition Forces in Iraq”, 奉普慈特慈的真主之名 - 中国伊斯省略协会对驻伊美英联军虐俘事件的声明.
[5] The official website of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Iraq, 2017, “Speech by President Xi Jinping at the United Nations Office at Geneva”, http://iq.chineseembassy.org/eng/zygx/t1432869.htm.
[6] See more information: Aljazeera, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/30/chinas-xi-calls-for-peace-conference-to-end-tremendous-suffering-in-gaza; CNN, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/30/china/xi-jinping-arab-leaders-china-intl-hnk/index.html; Al-Monitor, 2024, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/05/chinas-xi-calls-middle-east-peace-conference.
[7] The statement released by the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China which is titled “Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas”, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202306/t20230618_11099414.html.
[8] More details can be found on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China under the title of China and Palestine: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2868_663726/.
[9] See the news from China Daily titled UN General Assembly backs Palestinian bid for UN membership: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/11/WS663ec096a31082fc043c67f1.html.
[10] The Dungan Revolts were two waves of uprising by various Chinese Muslims, mostly Hui people, in Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia provinces in the first wave, and then in Xinjiang in the second wave, between 1862 and 1877.
[11] 吴万善 , 1991, “清代西北回民起义硏究”兰州大学出版社, pg. 62 - China, Northwest - 304 pages.
[12] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202310/1299809.shtml and https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/28/world/asia/china-israel-hamas-antisemitism.html.
[13] This claim is also reported in the article of VOA Chinese print with the title of “华人穆斯林如何看待以哈战争?” , https://www.voachinese.com/a/whats-happening-in-the-gaza-strip-and-how-chinese-muslims-view-the-israel-hamas-conflict-20231026/7328311.html.
[15] Zhang Chengzhi spent three years revising the book “History of the Mind”, which was limited to 750 copies and successfully raised US$100,000.
[16] Many WeChat comments shared by Hui Muslims call him an “inspirational imam”.
[17] 本文摘自《回族研究》2013年第1期 , http://www.duost.com/20150813/148973.html.
Deeply insightful. Thank you for this important perspective!